When the Principal Cheers the Agent: Corruption, Political Violence, and Cultural Capture in an Age of Democratic Backsliding

Niousha Roshani

doi:10.70254/controlvisible.2026.6.87

Autores/as

Niousha Roshani Green Yield https://orcid.org/0009-0007-4749-5468

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.70254/controlvisible.2026.6.87

Palabras clave:

corruption, principal-agent theory, cultural corruption, democratic backsliding, state capture, armed conflict, Colombia, Africa, fiscal control

Resumen

Si bien la segunda edición de Corruption and Government (2016), de Rose-Ackerman y Palifka, sigue constituyendo el marco más riguroso y exhaustivo dentro de la economía política de la corrupción, esta reseña sostiene que su modelo principal-agente presenta una limitación crítica: no logra explicar aquellos contextos en los que la corrupción ha llegado a ser no solo sistémica, sino también cultural, es decir, está arraigada desde el votante hasta el político, desde la calle hasta el Estado.

Tomando como referencia principal el caso colombiano y apoyándose en evidencia comparativa proveniente de Mozambique, Angola, la República Democrática del Congo y Nigeria, esta revisión argumenta que las propuestas de reforma planteadas en el libro —leyes de transparencia, organismos independientes de auditoría y reformas del servicio civil— presuponen la existencia de bases institucionales y de una demanda ciudadana de rendición de cuentas que simplemente no existen en sociedades donde la violencia política y los intercambios corruptos han constituido la lógica de gobierno durante generaciones.

La reseña concluye señalando tres elementos que una tercera edición debería incorporar: la administración pública conductual, para explicar el voto expresivo a favor de actores corruptos; el retroceso democrático (democratic backsliding) como una variable estructural y no como una barrera exógena; y los mecanismos de rendición de cuentas no estatales como la principal frontera de reforma en Estados capturados o afectados por conflictos.

El libro sigue siendo una obra esencial. Sin embargo, ya no es suficiente.

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Biografía del autor/a

Niousha Roshani, Green Yield

Ph.D. in Education from University College London, a Master’s in International Development from Cornell University, and completed a postdoctoral fellowship at Harvard University focused on public policy for racial equity in Latin America. She is the co-founder of the Content Policy and Society Lab (CPSL) at Stanford University and has been a senior researcher in various global think tanks and academic institutions. She has served as a senior advisor to IDB Invest and has advised governments across Latin America on institutional reform and economic inclusion strategies. She has worked with government officials and journalists across the Global South on electoral transparency and misinformation. She is Managing Partner of Green Yield, an advisory firm focused on the energy transition across Latin America and Africa. She has worked in over 25 countries and is fluent in five languages.

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